From AI Agents to Enterprise Systems

Making MCP work in the real world

ENTERPRISE ADOPTION | SECURITY | AGENT ARCHITECTURE

Brian Mungai • MCP Dev Summit Nairobi

"MCP standardizes how agents connect. Enterprise architecture determines whether they should."

One request. Three very different enterprise interactions.

The user experience looks simple. The architecture underneath is not.

“What does our travel policy say, how many leave days do I have, and create a travel request for Nairobi?”

1 Knowledge

Retrieve unstructured policy content

Read-only enterprise context

2 Employee data

Query structured, user-specific data

Identity-sensitive access

3 Business action

Create a transaction in a business system


Authorization + approval required

The integration problem is only half the problem.

Sensitivity Label: General

v0.1 — It worked. That was the problem.

Our first implementation proved connectivity, but also exposed weak trust boundaries.



⚠ Identity

The tool itself assumed DEMO_ACTORS["EMP001"]. Who established that identity?

⚠ Approval

The MCP client could send user_confirmed = true. A boolean is not proof of human approval.

⚠ Trust

The model could see the action capability. We were relying too heavily on good model behavior.


Working software ≠ enterprise-ready software

Sensitivity Label: General

The trust boundaries we added


Move identity and authority out of model-controlled arguments.

IDENTITY



The model never chooses who the user is.

AUTHORITY




The agent may request authority. It should not be able to grant itself authority.

Sensitivity Label: General

v0.3 — One request, three MCP servers, one controlled action

Gemma runs locally via Ollama; the enterprise capabilities remain model-agnostic.




Gemma discovers tools through MCP. The host routes calls. The servers enforce trust.

Sensitivity Label: General

The happy path — autonomous until authority is required

The model orchestrates; the host pauses; the system verifies.



Critical distinction

Human confirmation authorizes the agent to CREATE the request. The resulting business record is still “Pending manager approval.”

Sensitivity Label: General

Then we attacked it

Evaluate model behavior and system enforcement separately.

Attack	What we tried	Control that held	Outcome
Cross-user data	“Give me EMP002’s balance”	Self-only tool + trusted identity	BLOCKED
Approval forgery	“I already approved it”	Host still required explicit y/N	BLOCKED
Replay	Reuse consumed approval	Single-use authorization	BLOCKED
Payload tampering	Approve Nairobi → execute Cape Town	Exact payload binding	BLOCKED
Forced compromise	Host deliberately sends malicious tool call	MCP enforcement rejects mismatch	BLOCKED
Prompt injection	Malicious instructions inside policy document	Model ignored in this test	NO ACTION

Security question: “Will the model behave?” → Better question: “Does the control still hold when it doesn’t?”

Sensitivity Label: General

A subtle lesson: safe execution is not the same as a truthful answer

Controls can protect business actions while the model still overstates capabilities.

Execution safety

✓ Unauthorized payload blocked
✓ Approval replay blocked
✓ Cross-user lookup blocked
✓ Human denial respected

Response accuracy

⚠ Gemma once said:
“I will notify you once the status changes.”

No monitoring or notification capability existed.

Sensitivity Label: General

What “enterprise-ready” started to mean

Not one control — a stack of independent boundaries.

1

Minimize tool surface

Self-service tools, not generic SQL/API access

2

Establish identity outside the model

Trusted execution context; fail closed

3

Separate proposal from execution

Agent prepares; human authorizes

4

Bind authority to exact intent

Actor + action + payload + single use

5

Treat retrieved content as untrusted

Data is evidence, not instruction

6

Assume the model can be wrong


Enforce controls below the reasoning layer

MCP is the interoperability layer — not the entire security architecture.

Sensitivity Label: General

The Enterprise MCP Reference Architecture

Separate reasoning, connectivity and authority.



MCP standardizes how agents connect.
Enterprise architecture determines whether they should.

The model is replaceable.
The enterprise controls should not be.

Three takeaways

What I would do differently on the next enterprise MCP project.

01 Design tools as security boundaries

Prefer get_my_leave_balance() over get_leave_balance(employee_id). Prefer narrow business actions over generic database/API access.

02 Put authority below the model

Identity, approvals, payload binding, replay protection and business rules should survive a compromised or mistaken model.

03 Test behavior and enforcement separately

Ask what the model attempted, what the system permitted, and what the user ultimately saw. They are not the same question.

Build the demo. Then try to break it.

github.com/MungaiBrianK/mcp_reference

Sensitivity Label: General