KubeCon + CloudNativeCon North America 2026
@Salt Lake City, USA

HITACHI

Least-Privilege by Default

Standardizing Identity-Aware AI Agent Access into a Golden Path

Masato Kozuka
IAM Specialist, Hitachi, Ltd.

Date
November 11, 2026

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About me



Masato Kozuka
IAM Specialist, Hitachi, Ltd. in Japan

Current AI Focus

- IAM architecture for enterprise AI platforms

Core Technical Background

- Enterprise IAM/SSO architecture, including Keycloak implementations
- Security consulting on API hardening & Zero Trust access
- Platform Engineering advisory for enterprise adoption

Community & Speaking


- Keycloak contributor & Backstage organization member
- Maintainer of Backstage Auth Plugin (for Keycloak)
- Speaker at BackstageCon NA 2026, AGNTCon+MCPCon NA 2026, Open Source Summit Japan 2025, MuleSoft Meetup Tokyo, etc.

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An agent can do anything it has access to

Tricked or just wrong, it still calls with **valid credentials**, so every server lets it through.




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Every team secures access its own way

MCP made connecting tools easy. **Least-privilege access to each tool** is still left to each team.



The result is not just security gaps, but **platform sprawl**: every new team adds one more way to secure access.

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
The answer to both: least privilege, by default

Each problem gives us **half of the answer**.

An agent can do anything it has access to.

Least privilege

Not everything it can reach.
Only what it should.



Every team secures it its own way.

by default

One layer, the same for **every team**. No team has to opt in.

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Least privilege by default comes down to two questions

We answer them in order: we can't make it **the default** until we know **what must be enforced**.

What must be enforced on every agent call?

Q1

The security model

How does the platform make it the default?

Q2

The Golden Path

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Part 1: The security model

Q1: What must be enforced on every agent call?




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Least privilege is what both the user and the agent may do

For agents acting on behalf of a user, this definition **comes down to three questions.**

On every call, allow only what



Skip any one, and an attack gets through. We'll see each.

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Q1: What must be enforced on every agent call?

1 — **On whose behalf?**

OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange

2 — Which agent?


3 — What's allowed?

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Keep the user in the token, all the way to the server

Exchange the token at every hop, but keep the user in **sub**.




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An agent's own token erases the user

With client_credentials, sub names the agent. It fulfills the user's requests on its own authority: a **confused deputy**.



Fix it in **two places**: disable agent service accounts, and reject any token without a user.

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Every call carries the user, never the agent alone

The rule, and the fixes that close its shortcut.

1 **On whose behalf?**

The user, on every call

2 Which agent?

3 What's allowed?

Rule

Exchange the user's token

Closes the shortcut


Disable agent service accounts

Reject tokens without a user

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Part 1 · The security model

Q1: What must be enforced on every agent call?



Which agent?


SPIFFE

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Only a checked pod gets the agent's name

The IdP **checks the person** behind each user. Nothing checks the workload behind an agent.
SPIFFE is an open standard that gives each workload a name.




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A static key lets anyone become the agent

A client secret or a key file **does name the agent**, but it's issued **without attestation**.
Whoever copies it gets the agent's name, and **everything that agent may do**.



Fix it at **the source**: replace static keys with attestation, and accept only SPIFFE client auth.

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Only an attested workload can be the agent

The rule, and the fix that closes its shortcut.

1 **On whose behalf?**
The user, on every call

2 **Which agent?**
An attested workload

3 What's allowed?

Rule

Exchange the user's token

Closes the shortcut


Disable agent service accounts

Reject tokens without a user

Replace static keys with attestation

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Q1: What must be enforced on every agent call?




What’s allowed?

An ABAC-centered decision

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Both identities are genuine. The attack still works

Both are **identified**, but nothing has **decided** what's allowed.




Asked only to **review**, the agent also **pulled salaries** and paid the expense.

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Decide twice: at the token, and at every tool call


Layer 2 can only narrow what **Layer 1** allows.



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Allow a call only when both the user and the agent may make it

Attributes of the **user**, the **agent**, and the **tool** decide each call.




The injected receipt reaches the Expense MCP server, but **can't make the agent pay it**.

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Skipping the aud check makes Layer 1 useless

Layer 1 issues no Payroll token. But Payroll accepts **the Expense token** instead.



Fix it at **every server**: check that aud names this server.

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Seven rules must be enforced on every agent call

The answer to Q1, grouped by the three questions.

1 On whose behalf?

The user, on every call

Rule

- Exchange the user's token

Closes the shortcut

- Disable agent service accounts
- Reject tokens without a user

2 Which agent?

An attested workload

- Replace static keys with attestation

3 What's allowed?

Only what both may


- Issue tokens only for allowed targets
- Decide on both user and agent
- Check aud at every server

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Part 2: The Golden Path

Q2: How does the platform make these seven rules every team’s default?



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One team's shortcut gets into another team's server

Back to the three teams: each skips a **different rule**, and each is a common shortcut.



So all seven rules have to **come from the platform**.

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Where each rule runs decides how it becomes the default

A rule is the default when no team has to **opt in**.

	1 On whose behalf?	2 Which agent?	3 What's allowed?
	The user, on every call	An attested workload	Only what both may
Rule	① Exchange token	② Attestation only	③ Allowed targets only ③ Decide on both
Closes the shortcut	① No service accounts ① User required		③ Check aud

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Where each rule runs decides how it becomes the default

A rule is the default when no team has to **opt in**.

Two ways to make a rule the default

Runs in systems the platform operates

Keycloak (authorization server)
SPIRE (SPIFFE issuer)

- ① No service accounts
- ② Attestation only
- ③ Allowed targets only

Runs inside each team’s agents and servers

agent sidecar · server middleware

- ① Exchange token
- ③ Check aud
- ① User required
- ③ Decide on both

One input from each team

Only the team knows

Backstage template (form)

```
# declared by the teams
name:    expense-agent
targets: [expense-mcp]
tools:
    pay_expense: high
```

example schema


4 Can’t skip it
Off the path, no token.

5 No reason to skip it
Ships in Backstage templates.

6 Intent only
Teams declare. Owners approve.

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Q2: How does the platform make these seven rules every team’s default?



Can’t skip it


Off the path, no token.

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An agent off the Golden Path never gets a token

Every token comes from Keycloak, and **the platform runs every check** on the way to it.




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One setting in the platform opens a hole for every team

The platform creates every agent's client **the same way**, so one default left on reaches all of them.



Don't set it **by hand**: generate each agent's client from its declaration.

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Q2: How does the platform make these seven rules every team’s default?



No reason to skip it


Ships in Backstage templates.

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Every server starts with the checks already written

The middleware **comes with the server template**. A team writes only its tools.




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A server built off the template skips the checks


A template removes the **reason** to skip a check. It can't stop a team that builds without it.



Unless a team skips it **on purpose**, the template is the easy path.

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Q2: How does the platform make these seven rules every team’s default?



Intent only

Teams declare. Owners approve.

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Platform enforces. Teams declare. Owners approve

Read across the two red lanes: **a few declarations and approvals, and no auth code.**


	①	②	③	①	③	①	③
	No service accounts	Attestation only	Allowed targets only	Exchange token	Check aud	User required	Decide on both
	Keycloak setting	Template SPIRE entry + client	Keycloak config generated per agent	Sidecar	Middleware	Middleware	Middleware
Teams declare in a Backstage template · example schema		agent name agent team	targets agent team				tool attributes server team
Owners approve			approves the agent server owner				approves its attributes server owner

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Each target's owner approves, so no central queue forms

A broad declaration splits into **one request per target**, and each owner sees only theirs.




New kinds of policy still go to a central team, and an owner can still approve without looking.

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Teams own agents and servers. Platform owns the rest

Follow one call: **each red box** is where **a rule is enforced**.



Platform: ships in the Golden Path

Agent team: agent, declaration


MCP server owner: server, approvals

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Demo

The answer to Q2, running




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4 Can't skip it — 5 No reason to skip it — 6 Intent only

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We build one agent on the Golden Path, then attack it

Build runs the answer to Q2. Attack replays the opening receipt.




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4 Can't skip it — 5 No reason to skip it — 6 Intent only

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Build: the team declares, the platform creates the rest

Three things to watch, one for each part of the answer to Q2.



BUILD the answer to Q2

Declare & approve — 6 Intent only

A template form, approved by the target's owner.

Watch: Only a name and a target, then the owner approves.

Templates — 5 No reason to skip it

Templates build the server and the agent's pod.

Watch: Neither team writes auth code.

Provision — 4 Can't skip it

Registers the SPIRE entry and the client.

Watch: The client reaches only expense-mcp.


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4 Can't skip it — 5 No reason to skip it — 6 Intent only

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Attack: the opening receipt gets no token for Payroll

The declared call still works. The undeclared one never starts.



ATTACK Replay: the receipt tells the agent to call Payroll

Allowed

5 No reason to skip it 6 Intent only

expense-mcp is declared and approved. The middleware checks pass.

Watch: aud is this server, sub is the user.

Blocked

4 Can't skip it 6 Intent only

payroll-mcp isn't declared. Keycloak issues no token for it.

Watch: No token is issued.

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Takeaways

What to take back to your platform




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A security model, and a Golden Path to ship it

Q1 · what must be enforced

Q2 · how the platform makes it the default



Identify

Put two identities on every call.
The user in sub.
The agent in client_id.

Decide

Allow only what both may do.
The token limits where.
the policy check limits what.

Standardize

Build seven rules into the Golden Path.
Teams declare.
Owners approve.

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Thank you

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Least-Privilege by Default

Standardizing Identity-Aware AI Agent Access into a Golden Path

Session feedback

Masato Kozuka
IAM Specialist, Hitachi, Ltd.

Date
November 11, 2026

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